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High-skilled emigration is an emotive issue that in 
popular discourse is often referred to as brain drain, 
conjuring images of extremely negative impacts on 
developing countries. Recent discussions of brain gain, 
diaspora effects, and other advantages of migration 
have been used to argue against this, but much of the 
discussion has been absent of evidence. This paper builds 
upon a new wave of empirical research to answer eight 
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key questions underlying much of the brain drain debate: 
1) What is brain drain? 2) Why should economists care 
about it? 3) Is brain drain increasing? 4) Is there a positive 
relationship between skilled and unskilled migration? 5) 
What makes brain drain more likely? 6) Does brain gain 
exist? 7) Do high-skilled workers remit, invest, and share 
knowledge back home? and 8) What do we know about 
the fiscal and production externalities of brain drain? 
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Brain  drain  worries  many  policymakers  in  migrant-sending  countries.  Governments 
complain about decimated medical systems, shortages of teachers and engineers, and poaching of 
talent their national education systems had paid to train. As one example, Parliament speaker 
Nabih Berri of Lebanon called brain drain the ―biggest problem we face in Lebanon‖ and called 
emigration of graduates a ―transmitted disease among the youth‖ (Daily Star, 2010). While such 
concerns  have  been  present  for  decades,  they  have  gained  increasing  prominence  as  many 
developed countries have moved to more skill-selective immigration systems and as the spread 
of HIV/AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa has drawn attention to constraints facing medical systems in 
those countries. Thus, advocacy groups like Physicians for Human Rights (2009) put out press 
releases about their petitions with titles like: ―US Should Not Deprive Poor Countries of Doctors 
and Nurses, Say Global Health Advocates.‖ 
The term ―brain drain‖ dominates popular discourse on high-skilled migration, and for 
this reason we use it in this article. However, as Harry Johnson (1965, p. 299) noted, the term 
brain drain ―is obviously a loaded phrase, involving implicit definitions of economic and social 
welfare, and implicit assertions about facts. This is because the term `drain‘ conveys a strong 
implication of serious loss.‖ But it is far from clear such a loss actually occurs in practice; 
indeed, there is an increasing recognition of the possible benefits that skilled migration can offer 
both for migrants and for sending countries. Thus, Prime Minister Manhoman Singh of India 
recently said: ―Today we in India are experiencing the benefits of the reverse flow of income, 
investment and expertise from the global Indian diaspora. The problem of ‗brain drain‘ has been 
converted happily into the opportunity of ―brain gain‖ (Government of India, 2010).  
Brain  drain  has  also  been enjoying a renaissance as  a subject  of study:  according to 
Econlit there were 247 articles on brain drain written between 2005 and 2009—about twice as 
many as over the previous 15 years combined. A notable feature of these recent studies has been 
a rise in the number of empirical contributions, covering both better descriptive data at the cross-
country level as well as detailed study of individual country cases. As a result, for the first time 
we actually  have some  data to  help  answer many of the pressing questions  economists and 
policymakers have about brain drain. 
This paper builds upon this wave of research to answer eight key questions underlying 
much of the brain drain debate: 1) What is brain drain? 2) Why should economists care about it? 
3) Is brain drain increasing? 4) Is there a positive relationship between skilled and unskilled 3 
 
migration? 5) What makes brain drain more likely? 6) Does brain gain exist? 7) Do high-skilled 
workers remit, invest, and share knowledge back home? 8) What do we know about the fiscal 
and production externalities of brain drain? 
We do not focus on the consequences of high-skilled immigration for receiving countries, 
in part because there has been less recent literature on this, and in part because the effects are 
less controversial—typical findings emphasize how high-skilled immigrants become involved in 
entrepreneurial  activities  and  have  positive  fiscal  consequences  for  government  in  receiving 
countries.  We  are  also  deliberately  selective  in  summarizing  the  recent  literature  on  the 
consequences  of  out-migration  for  development.  Readers  are  directed  to  excellent  recent 
contributions by Kapur and McHale (2005) and Docquier and Rapoport (2011) for additional 
discussion,  particularly  with  regard  to  the  recent  theoretical  literature  and  macroeconomic 
evidence. 
Question 1: What is Brain Drain?  
The term ―brain drain‖ was coined by the British Royal Society to refer to the exodus of 
scientists and technologists from the United Kingdom to the United States and Canada in the 
1950s and 1960s (Cervantes and Guellec, 2002). Now it is more typically used to refer to the 
emigration of a nation‘s most highly skilled individuals. Rapoport and Docquier (2006) note in 
their  entry  in  the  New  Palgrave  Dictionary  that  it  is  most  commonly  used  to  denote  the 
―migration of engineers, physicians, scientists, and other very highly skilled professionals with 
university training.‖ Typically these movements are from developing to developed countries, but 
it is also common to see newspaper stories concerned about brain drain from rural areas within 
the United States, and from selected high-income countries. For example, the 2010 economic 
crisis in Ireland has resulted in scores of stories lamenting the likely brain drain of university 
graduates (for example, Fitzgerald, 2010). 
 
Skilled migration constitutes a disproportionately high share of total migration. Docquier 
and Marfouk (2005) define a country‘s brain drain rate for a particular educational level as the 
share of all individuals with that education level aged 25 and over born in that country who live 
abroad. In the median country in their data we calculate that the brain drain rate for tertiary-
educated individuals is 7.3 times that of individuals with only primary education, and 3.5 times 4 
 
that of individuals with only secondary schooling. As an example, 2.6 percent of Cambodians 
aged 25 and above with primary education live abroad, compared to 5.9 percent of those with 
secondary education and 18.3 percent of those with tertiary education. 
 
Table  1  uses  data  from  the  2008  American  Community  Survey  to  show  the  top  10 
occupations for tertiary-educated developing country migrants in the United States according to 
their level of tertiary education.
1 In order to focus only on migrants who received at least their 
undergraduate tertiary education in their home countr y, we consider only individuals who 
migrated at age 25 or older, with the sample size in the table showing the number of developing 
country migrants in this survey who meet these criteria . The majority of skilled migrants come 
from a variety of professions , with computer specialists, accountants, managers, and among 
higher education levels, scientists and academics, the most common.  
 
Much of the popular discussion and debate about  brain drain concerns the migration of 
doctors and nurses, but as Table 1 sho ws, while medical professionals are indeed among the 
most common occupations, they account for only 12-15 percent of educated immigrants. Health 
professionals are also the minority of tertiary-educated immigrants in other countries. In the 2001 
Canadian Census, health professionals constitute 5.7 percent of working individuals who arrived 
in Canada at age 25 or older and have b achelor‘s degrees or higher, 3 percent of those with a 
masters degree or higher, and 3.9 percent of those with Ph.D.s. In Canada, scientists, teachers 
and  professors  are  the  most  common  occupations,  accounting  for  45  percent  of  those  with 
masters degrees or above, and 65 percent of those with Ph.D.s. Similarly, according to the 2001 
United Kingdom Census, health professionals are also only 6.9 percent of the tertiary-educated 
migrants from developing countries who came to the United Kingdom after age 24, with this 
number increasing to 10 percent if one also includes non-professional positions in healthcare 
occupations. In South Africa, the 2001 Census shows health professionals to be 8.2 percent of 
tertiary-educated  immigrants  from  developing  countries  who  arrived  after  age  24,  and  14.1 
percent of those with masters degrees or higher. 
 
                                                           
1 We take ―developing country‖ to refer to all countries which are not classified by the World Bank as ―high 
income‖ -- that is, which have 2009 Gross National Income per capita of $12,195 or lower.  5 
 
Not only are health professionals not the majority of high-skilled emigrants, but they 
appear to have lower emigration rates on average than other skilled professionals. We compare 
the overall brain drain rates for tertiary educated migrants who emigrated at age 22 or higher 
(Beine  et  al,  2007)  to  the  medical  brain  drain  rates  in  Bhargava  et  al.  (2010).  Across  161 
countries, the median medical brain drain rate is 5.4 percent, compared to a median skilled brain 
drain rate of 8.4 percent. The skilled brain drain rate exceeds the medical brain drain rate for 69 
percent of the countries in this sample. 
 
Mattoo et al. (2010) note that there is often a concern that not all educated migrants end 
up working in skilled occupations after they have migrated— a phenomenon which they call 
―brain  waste.‖  However,  Table  1  shows  that  the  most  common  occupations  for  educated 
migrants  are  skilled  occupations,  particularly  those  in  the  so-called  STEM  fields  (science, 
technology, engineering and mathematics). Moreover, using the same 2008 sample we calculate 
that 79 percent of working migrants from developing countries with a bachelors‘ degree or more 
are working in occupations in the United States in which the majority of workers have post-
secondary education, as are 90 percent of those with a masters degree or more, and 96 percent of 
those with a Ph.D. The stereotype of foreign workers with Ph.D.s driving taxis is certainly the 
exception;  only  2  out  of  1,936  developing  country  migrants  with  Ph.D.s  in  the  American 
Community Survey sample are taxi drivers. This is in line with Mattoo et al.‘s (2010) work using 
the  2000  census,  where  they  find  it  is  mainly  skilled  migrants  from  non-English  speaking 
countries  with  poor  quality  education  systems  who  struggle  to  find  skilled  work—a  finding 
which might mean that the actual skill level of these migrants is lower than their education would 
suggest. 
 
Question 2: Why Should Economists Care About Brain Drain? 
Recently we heard from editors of two of the professions‘ top economics journals that 
work on brain drain is ―of great interest to specialists, but insufficiently broad in scope for our 
general-interest audience,‖ and that one might equally ―consider brain drain from the state of 
Florida to the rest of the US and other countries‖. It therefore appears worth summarizing some 
of the reasons economists should care about brain drain, and some ways in which it differs from 
internal mobility. 6 
 
First, brain drain has been and continues to be an area of tremendous policy concern in 
many  countries.  Over  the  past  decade,  Factiva  shows  an  average  of  5,000  news  articles  in 
English per year about this topic. There are many claims that brain drain decimates healthcare 
and  educational  systems  in  developing  countries,    and  that  failure  to  stop  it  could  lead  to 
―economic and social  catastrophe on an unprecedented scale‖ (Sattaur, 1989). The extent to 
which such claims are true should matter to economists. 
Second, brain drain takes place in the context of what is probably the largest distortion in 
the  international  global  economic  system:  barriers  on  the  mobility  of  labor.  Constraints  on 
movement  lead  to  very  large  gaps  between  the  incomes  that  can  be  earned  in  different 
destinations – gaps which are orders of magnitude larger than one sees with internal movements. 
In a recent study of the top academic students from five countries, we document increases in 
income of $40,000-$60,000 per year when the highly skilled emigrate from developing countries 
(Gibson  and  McKenzie,  2010).  These  barriers  also  restrict  the  extent  to  which  less-skilled 
workers can react to the migration decisions of the higher-skilled. In these ways, international 
migration is quite different from within-country migration. Unskilled Floridians are free to move 
to other states if skilled Floridians move, whereas unskilled workers in developing countries 
have much more limited opportunities to follow skilled compatriot workers who migrate. 
Third, the economic literature on brain drain has long been concerned about the existence 
and extent of production and fiscal externalities. Almost a half century ago, Grubel and Scott 
(1966)  noted  that  if  labor  markets  are  competitive  and  individuals  are  paid  their  marginal 
product, then if there are no externalities, the departure of highly skilled emigrants would not 
reduce  the  welfare  of  those  left  behind.  In  practice,  if  skilled  and  unskilled  labor  are 
complements in production, and skilled workers do not capture all of the increase in production 
value that comes from this complementarity, then the departure of skilled workers could lower 
the  pay  or  employment  levels  of  unskilled  workers.  When  discussing  the  consequences  of 
possible out-migration from (say) Florida to the other 49 states, it is important to recognize that 
this would be in a context in which skills within Florida remain reasonably abundant, unskilled 
workers are also mobile, and a federal taxation system ensures that residents of Florida still 
benefit fiscally from the earnings of high-skilled individuals who migrate out of the state. Such 
conditions seem less likely to hold in most developing countries. Bhagwati and Hamada (1974) 
argued  that  the  fiscal  cost  was  particularly  important,  with  many  developing  countries 7 
 
subsidizing education with taxpayer money, and then high-skilled individuals who emigrate not 
contributing back into the tax system. More recently, much of the concern has been with the 
supposed externalities health and education professionals have on the well-being of others in 
their communities. The potential importance of such externalities, complementarities, and fiscal 
costs in practice strike us as important economic questions.  
Finally,  it  is  also  worth  reiterating  that  in  many  developed  countries,  immigrants 
constitute important shares of the skilled labor force in many professions. Understanding the 
determinants of this migration should therefore be of interest even to those whose prime focus is 
the U.S. economy. To illustrate this, table 2 uses the ACS 2008 to show the share of all tertiary 
educated workers, and of all workers with Ph.D.s who are foreign-born, and who are born in 
developing countries for the professions identified in table 1 as being the main occupations for 
skilled migrants. We see developing country migrants constitute 47 percent of individuals with a 
Ph.D. working as computer software engineers in the U.S., 36 percent of medical scientists and 
35 percent of engineers with Ph.Ds. 
Question 3: Is Brain Drain Increasing?  
In  absolute  levels,  skilled  migration  is  increasing.  However,  skill  levels  in  migrant-
sending countries are also rising, and for the world as a whole, skilled migration rose at about the 
same pace as overall education levels in the sending countries in recent decades, so that the brain 
drain rate remained quite stable for long periods of time and may have even fallen in the past 
decade.  
Between 1960 and 2010, the global migrant stock increased from 74 to 188 million, only 
slightly faster than world population growth, so that the share of the world‘s population who are 
international migrants increased only from 2.7 to 2.8 percent (UNDP, 2009). However, while the 
global  migration  rate  has  been  quite  flat,  the  migrant  flow  has  increasingly  been  from  less 
developed to more developed countries, with a reduction in within-region flows. The number of 
individuals migrating from the ―South‖ to the ―North‖ increased from 14 million in 1960 to 60 
million in 2000 (Özden et al, 2010).
2 At the same time, the percentage of migrants with tertiary 
education increased dramatically. Defoort (2008) uses data from six main OECD destination 
                                                           
2 Özden et al (2010) define the ―North‖ as Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Canada, the United States, the EU-15, and 
other  nations  of  the  European  Free  Trade  Association,  and  the  ―South‖  as  all  other  countries.  It  therefore 
corresponds to countries which were developed or developing in 1960. 8 
 
countries to estimate that the proportion of adult migrants with tertiary education increased four-
fold  over  1975-2000.  The  increasing  amount  of  South-North  migration  coupled  with  the 
increasing skill level of this migrant flow means that brain drain is increasing in absolute terms. 
However, educational levels in developing countries have also been rising dramatically 
over the past decades. As a result, de Foort (2008) finds that the rate of high-skilled emigration 
(relative to the base of all tertiary-educated individuals) has been very stable at the global level 
over the period 1975-2000, with the educational level of the home workforce increasing at a 
similar rate to the increase in tertiary educated migrants. However, sub-Saharan Africa is an 
exception to this pattern – a region in which tertiary education growth remained low and did not 
offset the rise in skilled migration. 
Analysis of migration flows faces severe data constraints, and a full picture of brain drain 
trends during the 2000s will not emerge until after data are released from the 2010-11 round of 
global population Censuses. However, brain drain appears likely to have fallen in relative terms 
during  this  time.  Tertiary  enrolment  rates  have  continued  to  grow  dramatically,  with  gross 
tertiary enrolment rates for sub-Saharan Africa increasing from 3.9 percent in 1999 to 6.0 percent 
in 2009, those in South Asia increasing from 8.0 percent in 2000 to 11.4 percent in 2008, and 
those in Latin America and the Caribbean increasing from 20.9 percent in 1999 to 35.2 percent in 
2007 (World Bank WDI and GDF global database [accessed November 22, 2010]). At the same time as 
stocks of tertiary-educated individuals have been rising in many developing countries, the intake 
of skilled workers has been quite flat over the first part of the decade in many OECD destination 
countries, and fallen in 2008-2010. For example, the United States H1-B visa program (the main 
temporary  residence  category  for  admitting  skilled  workers
3)  issued visas to  an average of 
130,000 workers a year over the 2000s, reaching a peak in 2007 at  154,000, and dropping in 
2009 back to 110,000 (United States Department of State, 2011). It is worth noting how small 
this magnitude is – less than one skilled worker admitted per 1000 population. 
 
 
                                                           
3 There are a variety of other visa categories that also are directed towards skilled workers, but the number admitted 
through these are smaller. In particular, the H1-C program for registered nurses issued 128 visas in 2009; the L1 
category of intra-company transfer visas issued 64,000 visas, and the O1 category for individuals of extraordinary 
ability admitted 9,368 (United States State Department, 2011). By way of comparison, 690,000 individuals received 
permanent residency in the U.S. in 2010 as either the immediate relative of a U.S. citizen or as a family-sponsored 
migrant. 9 
 
Question 4: Is There a Positive Association Between Skilled and Unskilled Migration?  
Efforts by migrant-sending countries to halt or reduce levels of skilled migration typically 
assume that high skilled migration is a phenomenon largely unrelated to less-skilled migration – 
the  same  countries  concerned  about  outmigration  of  skilled  workers  typically  welcome  the 
remittances  and  job  opportunities  that  migration  provide  for  less-skilled  workers.  Likewise, 
immigrant-receiving  countries  may  wish  to  reduce  unskilled  immigration  while  increasing 
skilled immigration.   But the empirical evidence suggests that levels of skilled and unskilled 
migration actually have a strong positive association—and thus that attempts to limit one form of 
migration are likely to affect the other.  
Both skilled and unskilled migrants are likely to determine their migration decisions in 
part on the basis of the institutional characteristics of their home country, and the presence of 
common links with potential destination countries. One specific avenue for a positive association 
between high and low skill migrants is family reunification. In the U.S. New Immigrant Survey, 
for example, 45.8 percent of spouses who are brought into the country on a family visa by a 
university-educated migrant do not have a university degree – evidence of a channel through 
which an increase in the number of high skill migrants may also result in the increase in the 
number of low skill migrants.  
We analyze stocks of migrants to examine how the stocks of both high skill and low skill 
migrants evolve over time. We use two data sources: the database of Docquier and Marfouk 
(2005), which provides bilateral stocks of high and low skill migrants aged 25 and over from 198 
source countries in 31 destination OECD countries in 1990 and 2000, and the U.S. Integrated 
Public  Use  Microdata  Series  (IPUMS)  Census  data,  which  provides  similar  stocks  over  the 
period 1960 to 2000 for the United States (Ruggles et al., 2010).  
Figure 1 presents the relationship between the stocks of low skill and high skill migrants, 
with levels on the left and changes on the right. Each observation is a destination-source country 
pair in one year: for the OECD panels at the top there are multiple destination countries, whereas 
for the USA there is only one destination, but more years.  The panels on the left plot the log 
stock of high skill migrants in each source-destination corridor against the log stock of low skill 
migrants, after removing any year and destination country fixed effects.   The panels on the right 
also remove source country fixed effects, and so illustrate the correlation between the growth 10 
 
rate of high skill migrants and the growth rate of low skill migrants in each source-destination 
corridor. 
A clear positive relationship is evident both for the cross section and for the growth rates: 
countries that sent relatively many high skilled migrants to one country also sent relatively many 
low-skilled migrants to the same country. Similarly, when a country increases the number of 
high skill migrants it sends to a recipient country, the number of low skilled migrants to the same 
country also increases. To investigate further, we look for Granger causality in these datasets 
from  low  skill  migrants  to  high  skill  migrants  and  vice  versa.  Granger  causality  measures 
causality in a statistical sense: variable x is said to Granger cause y if the history of x predicts the 
current value of y, conditional on the history of y. We regress the level of high skill migrants on 
the lag of high skill migrants and the lag of low skill migrants, all measured in logarithms, along 
with year and destination country fixed effects.  In the OECD data, there is strong evidence of 
Granger causality from high skilled to low skilled migration (coefficient of 0.118), and strong 
evidence of Granger causality from low to high skilled (coefficient of 0.129), both significant at 
the 1 percent level. For the U.S. data, it is also the case that the number of high-skilled migrants 
in one period helps predict the number of low-skilled migrants 10 years later (coefficient of 
0.128), with significance at the 5 percent level.  
Therefore it does not appear to be the case that the rise in skilled migration is coming at 
the expense of less-skilled migrants – instead countries with a high number of skilled migrants 
also have a high number of less-skilled migrants in both the cross-section and over time. 
 
Question 5: What Makes Brain Drain More Likely? 
High-skill individuals often stand to multiply their income by emigrating out of low-
income countries. Yet in most developing countries, the majority of skilled individuals do not 
emigrate. Recent empirical research at both the macro and micro levels offers evidence on what 
factors make migration of high-skill individuals more likely.  
At the macroeconomic level, the rate of brain drain varies widely across countries. The 
average developing country has 7.3 percent of its tertiary-educated population stock in higher-
income countries, with this proportion varying from 5.4 percent or below in developing countries 
with populations of 40 million or more to 13 percent in sub-Saharan Africa and 45 percent in 11 
 
small developing island nations. Docquier et al. (2007) report these numbers and examine the 
patterns of brain drain across countries. The strongest association is with country population 
size—that is, countries with less population have a higher proportion of brain drain. In addition, 
brain drain rates are higher in countries with fractionalization and political instability, and with 
low levels of human capital. Skilled emigrant stocks are similar for males and females globally, 
which translates into higher brain drain rates for females, given that home-country education 
rates for women lag those for men in many developing countries (Docquier and Rapoport, 2011). 
There is a large related literature which looks at what determines the share of a country‘s 
migrants who are highly skilled. Borjas (1987) noted the importance of inequality in the sending 
country relative to destination countries, predicting negative selection (i.e. migrants are more 
likely to be low-skilled) when inequality in the home country is higher than that abroad, and 
positive selection when the opposite holds. However, in practice, emigration levels are almost 
universally higher among tertiary-educated individuals than among those with less education. 
Grogger and Hanson (2011) suggest that one explanation is that income gaps are so large that it 
is the absolute gap in earnings rather than relative returns to skill that drives emigration. In the 
context of Mexican emigration to the U.S., McKenzie and Rapoport (2010) show that migrants 
become progressively less educated on average as the networks on which they can draw upon 
grow larger, showing the importance of migration costs in determining the pattern of selection. 
Clemens (2009) compares the rate of brain drain across countries by population size to 
the rate of brain drain from internal migration across provinces or states of the United States, 
Brazil,  Kenya  and  the  Philippines.  He  finds  that  the  rate  of  international  brain  drain  from 
countries with small populations is similar to the rate of internal brain drain from areas of small 
population – both point to the desire for skilled workers to agglomerate in highly populated 
areas. 
At  the  microeconomic  level,  our  recent  detailed  surveys  of  the  highest-scoring  high 
school graduates from New Zealand, Papua New Guinea and Tonga also underscore the role of 
factors  other  than  income  gaps  in  determining  the  decision  to  migrate,  and  the  decision  of 
whether to stay abroad or return (Gibson and McKenzie, 2011). We find emigration decisions to 
be  driven  more  by  broader  career  concerns  such  as  the  quality  of  opportunities  to  conduct 
research, to work with leaders in the profession, and to learn from the best, as well as lifestyle 
and  family  reasons,  than  by  how  much  more  people  could  earn  abroad.  Clemens  (2009) 12 
 
summarizes survey evidence from health workers in Africa who similarly indicate professional 
advancement, better facilities  to  work in,  and safety  for their families  as  prime motives  for 
migrating, in addition to the higher incomes they can earn. 
The evidence is consistent with the high-skilled wanting to be in places in which they can 
live well, without fear of violence or instability, and in which they have sufficient opportunities 
to advance their careers and work with like-minded people. It is thus not surprising that India, 
with a large population, rapidly growing economy, and high-tech centers, sees brain drain now as 
much less of a problem that small, remote or politically unstable countries do.  
 
Question 6: Does Brain Gain Exist? 
A series of theoretical papers over the past 15 years, summarized in Docquier and Rapoport 
(2011), have shown that it is possible that high-skilled emigration can lead to a rise in human 
capital levels in the home country. The basic idea of such ―brain gain‖ theories is that decisions 
of individuals to invest in education react to the prospect of future migration, and that not all 
those who choose to increase their education because of the chance they may migrate actually 
end up migrating. Providing more opportunities to work in the U.S. for doctors and nurses from 
poor countries may then not deplete supplies of medical workers at home, but could in principle 
raise them by increasing the incentives  for people in  poor countries  to train  as  doctors and 
nurses. 
In the last few years, some case study microeconomic evidence has started to emerge on 
whether  such  a  mechanism  operates  in  practice.  The  key  challenge  for  empirical  work  is 
identifying a plausible source of exogenous variation in either migration opportunities or returns 
to  skill  abroad,  which  can  then  be  used  to  examine  the  responsiveness  of  human  capital 
acquisitions. Shrestha (2010) uses a change in the educational requirements of British Gurkha 
Army recruiters in 1993, which increased the returns to education abroad for Gurkha men in 
Nepal, to show that this led to increases in the probabilities of completing primary and secondary 
education for males affected by this change. Chand and Clemens (2008) look at the response of 
Indo-Fijians to a 1987 coup in Fiji, which they argue affected the incentive to acquire education 
in order to emigrate for Indo-Fijians, but not for ethnic Fijians. They find increases in levels of 
Form 7 (13
th grade) education and in bachelor degrees. Finally, Docquier et al. (2010) show that 13 
 
after the 1995 Bosman ruling by the European Court of Justice (ECR I-04921), which increased 
the opportunities for African soccer players to play in Europe, the skill level of African soccer 
leagues most likely to supply players to Europe increased.
 4 
These case studies share two notable features. First, these studies consider populations 
whose migration is constrained by policy barriers, so that not all who would like to migrate are 
able to. A brain gain effect can occur even with open borders, if people acquire education to give 
them the option value of migrating, and then do not all exercise this option (Katz and Rapoport, 
2005). However, the brain gain is more likely when policy barriers limit the number who can 
migrate. Second, these studies consider cases in which the supply of schooling can easily absorb 
the added demand for more education. These factors are likely to apply to the cases of secondary 
education and undergraduate tertiary education in many countries, but may not hold when it 
comes to talking about doctors, scientists, and other high ability professionals.  
Infrastructure  constraints  and  government  restrictions  on  private  education  limit  the 
supply of medical and graduate education in many countries, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. 
If the government only allows one medical school with a fixed quota of students, then clearly it 
is not possible for more students to be induced to become doctors when migration possibilities 
open up.
5 In contrast, in countries like the Philippines, private providers allow the supply of 
nursing education to adapt quickly to increases in demand for such training as a result of 
migration  opportunities  for  nurses  abroad.  Furthermore,  given  the  skill -selective  nature  of 
immigration systems in many key destinations, the likelihood that a well -qualified doctor or 
scientist is able to migrate if desired will be substantially higher than for someone with just one 
year of tertiary education. As a result, there are reasons to believe the brain gain channel will not 
be as powerful for the most highly skilled as it is for the moderately skilled.  
Direct evidence as to whether this channel operates among the most highly skilled comes 
from surveys we have done of the ―best and brightest‖ individuals who were at the very top of 
their high school classes in their countries (Gibson and McKenzie, 2010). Among those top 
                                                           
4 The effect need not always be positive. In Mexico, McKenzie and Rapoport (2011) use variations in the likelihood 
of migrating to the United States induced by historic migration networks to show household migration can actually 
lower educational attainment of children, which they attribute to the low returns to education for illegal migrants in 
the United States. 
5 In a study of medical brain drain from 69 coun tries, using four three -year time intervals between  1991-2004, 
Bhargava et al. (2011 ) find that while the lagged physician brain drain rate does predict the growth rate of 
physicians, the coefficient is too small for the number of physicians remaining in t he developing country to rise as 
the brain drain rate is increased. 14 
 
students who were not currently migrants, 16 percent in Micronesia and Papua New Guinea, 20 
percent in Tonga, and 32 percent in Ghana said they had changed in part what they studied, or 
studied extra because of the prospect of potentially migrating. The channel for them though is 
not  so  much  in  terms  of  attainment,  as  in  what  they  study  –  more  report  studying  foreign 
languages and taking test preparation classes to pass entrance tests abroad. In some of these 
countries we also did surveys of teachers of 10
th to 12
th grade in the top secondary schools to see 
whether they taught anything differently as a result of the possibility their students may migrate. 
In  Micronesia,  35  percent  of  teachers  say  they  teach  things  they  wouldn‘t  otherwise  do: 
examples include U.S. history and culture, foreign languages, tolerance of different perspectives, 
and botanical procedures for plants grown abroad. In Papua New Guinea, where 27 percent of 
surveyed teachers say they teach material they wouldn‘t otherwise, coverage of exchange rates 
and international trade, and human resources and labor exports are mentioned. 
It is notable that most of these responses in terms of new human capital acquisition in our 
survey data are for knowledge that in large part only has its main payoffs abroad (although there 
will  also  be  some  benefits  in  the  home  country  for  those  individuals  whose  jobs  involve 
considerable contact with the outside world). This critique of brain gain theories is often raised 
with regard to medical migration, where it is noted that the prospect of migration may induce 
over-investment in fields like geriatric medicine which have high demand abroad, at the expense 
of fields like tropical medicine which have the greatest needs at home but little payoff abroad. 
We are unaware, however, of any research which goes beyond anecdote and description in this 
regard, so are unsure as to how serious an issue this is in practice. Nonetheless, in addition to the 
lack of supply elasticity and ease of movement for particular professions, it adds another reason 
to be cautious of claims that the prospect of migration will lead to beneficial brain gain. 
Finally, we should note that international migration can increase human capital levels in 
the home country even in the absence of an effect on incentives to acquire education. Two 
important channels for this are through the use of remittances and repatriated savings to alleviate 
liquidity constraints that otherwise prevent households from paying for schooling, and through 
return migration of individuals who acquire schooling abroad and return to their home countries. 
In  our  view  these  two  channels  are  likely  to  be  stronger  contributors  to  a  brain  gain  from 
international migration than incentive effects in most countries. This is particularly the case in 
small and poor countries in which facilities for further education are limited: for example, in 15 
 
Gibson  and  McKenzie  (2010)  we  find  that  90  percent  of  Micronesians  and  95  percent  of 
Tongans with bachelor degrees in their sample earned these degrees abroad, as did 28 percent of 
Ghanaians and 49 percent of Papua New Guineans with advanced degrees such as a masters or 
doctorate.  
Question 7: Do High-Skilled Workers Remit, Invest, and Share Knowledge Back Home? 
The  benefits  that  a  sending  country  might  receive  from  high-skilled  immigration  are 
usually listed in terms of return flows of income, investment and expertise from migrants back to 
the sending country. These are the kinds of benefits that underlie the claim by India‘s prime 
minister that modern India is benefitting from its high-skilled out-migration and the resulting 
global Indian diaspora. But how common are such benefits?  As we have seen, brain drain rates 
are highest from countries with small populations and those experiencing political instability and 
poor prospects for career success. Thus while India‘s annual remittances have now reached $55 
billion (World Bank, 2011) and India‘s high-skilled migrants have shaped the development of its 
impressive information technology sector (Saxenian, 2006), the experience of a country with a 
population of over one billion and a fast-growing economy may have few lessons to offer the 
small and/or unstable countries for which brain drain is at most an issue. New research offers a 
more mixed picture of the potential benefits of brain drain. 
Consider first remittances, the most visible channel through which migrants contribute to 
households  back  home.  Global  remittance  data  at  the  micro-level  are  not  currently  publicly 
available, so we use a database of 33,000 immigrants in 11 OECD countries put together by 
Bollard et al. (2010). In this sample, skilled migrants remit more than less-skilled migrants, with 
the  average  tertiary-educated  migrant  remitting  about  $1,000  per  year.  We  take  the  6,318 
migrants in their sample with tertiary education who come from countries with at least 50 skilled 
migrants in the database. We then remove survey fixed effects, and then, in Figure 2, plot the 
proportion of tertiary educated migrants who remit against Gross National Income per capita in 
the sending country. There are two important results. First, for most sending countries, less than 
half of tertiary-educated migrants send remittances. Second, there is a strong negative correlation 
between  income  levels  and  the  likelihood  that  skilled  migrants  remit.  In  this  sample,  the 
likelihood of remitting is significantly higher for countries with higher brain drain rates, but once 
we control for per capita income, this relationship is no longer significant.  16 
 
Both the incidence and the amount remitted appear to be even higher among the most 
highly-skilled migrants from countries with high levels of brain drain. Gibson and McKenzie 
(2010) report that between 68 and 93 percent of the developing country high-skilled migrants in 
their sample remit, with an average amount remitted of around $5,000. Clemens (2011) also 
finds an annual remittance level of about $5,000 in his survey of African physicians in the U.S. 
and  Canada.  Existing  empirical  evidence  therefore  does  support  the  idea  that  high-skilled 
migrants  remit,  particularly  back  to  lower-income  countries,  and  that  the  level  of  these 
remittances can be sizeable relative to per capita income in their home countries. 
Less empirical evidence is available about the extent to which high-skilled emigrants 
invest or engage in knowledge flow or return investment, especially for the types of countries for 
which brain drain rates are highest. At the cross-country level, Kugler and Rapoport (2007) and 
Javorcik  et  al.  (2011) find a positive relationship between the  number  of skilled migrants  a 
country  has  in  the  United  States  and  the  level  of  foreign  direct  investment  from  the  U.S. 
economy to that country. However, their dataset contains only two countries with population 
rates below one million, making it difficult to see whether this relationship holds in the smallest 
countries  for which brain drain  rates are highest.  At the micro-level,  Gibson  and McKenzie 
(2010) find very low incidence rates of high-skilled migrants being involved in trade facilitation 
or investment in business start-ups in their home countries: they estimate a small country like 
Tonga or Micronesia might gain at most $500-$2,000 per high-skilled migrant from trade and 
foreign direct investment. This contribution is a positive one, but unlikely to have large effects 
on development. 
Reductions in the cost of air travel and improvements in information technology make it 
significantly easier for high-skilled migrants today to continue to stay in contact with people in 
their  home  countries.  In  principle  this  opens  up  many  opportunities  for  knowledge  flow. 
However, again the types of knowledge flow that occur back to large and vibrant economies are 
likely to differ from those to smaller countries where brain drain rates are higher. Gibson and 
McKenzie (2010) find the main forms of knowledge flow of high-skilled migrants from Ghana, 
Micronesia,  Papua  New  Guinea,  and  Tonga  are  information  about  educational  and  work 




Question 8: What Do We Know About The Fiscal And Production Externalities Of Brain 
Drain? 
Policymakers  in  developing  countries  commonly  lament  that  they  pay  thousands  of 
dollars to train workers, only to see them migrate abroad. The obvious response to this is to say 
that this is a policy choice governments are making – they could instead charge the full cost of 
tertiary education in fees, with loans to pay for these that would then be forgiven if people work 
in their home country for a specified period of time. However many developing countries lack 
the capacity to recover these loans, and Albrecht and Ziderman (1991) in reviewing a number of 
student loan programs from the 1980s found that schemes in Brazil, Venezuela and Kenya ended 
up getting back less than 10 percent of the value of the loans issued. Moreover, even developed 
countries like New Zealand have faced large default rates on student loan payments  (Fisher, 
2010). 
Estimates  of  how  much  the  government  pays  vary  widely,  and  depend  on  the  split 
between public and private contributions to education in different countries. Easterly and Nyarko 
(2009) estimate costs per student of tertiary education of only 2-3 times per capita GNP in a 
number of African countries. However, much higher costs have been found in studies of the 
costs of training health professionals: for example, Muula et al (2006) claim a cost of $26,000 (in 
U.S. dollars) to pay for tertiary education of a nurse in Malawi  (on top of a further $4,800 to pay 
for primary and secondary schooling). 
Is it worthwhile for governments to pay these education costs?  Three elements of the 
return realized from these costs should be considered. The first factor, often ignored, is the gain 
in well-being for the trained individual. If our concern is whether this government spending is 
improving the well-being of the people that government represents, then we should include in the 
return on investment how much the education funded through this spending raises income levels 
for  the  people  this  money  is  spent  on.    Clearly  the  option  to  migrate  internationally  vastly 
increases the income that can be earned from a given level of education, therefore increasing the 
return on investment. 
Second,  the  fiscal  return  from  government  providing  such  training  depends  on  the 
incomes the high-skilled would earn if they had remained at home and the progressivity of the 
tax system. Two recent empirical studies have put some numbers on the extent of these returns 
lost through brain drain. Desai et al. (2009) estimate that the total annual fiscal impact in India of 18 
 
its migrants in the United States is a loss of 0.47 percent of gross national income in 2005. We 
calculate this equates to approximately $4,120 per migrant aged 25 and above in the United 
States.
6 Not all these workers are high-skilled, so the annual loss per high-skilled worker will be 
higher. However, the calculation also assumes that  all these emigrants would have become as 
equally skilled had they not emigrated, which is a heroic assumption likely to bias their estimates 
upwards. In Gibson and McKenzie (2010) we calculate annual fiscal losses of brain drain of the 
best and brightest of $500-1000 per migrant in Micronesia and Tonga, which have low and quite 
flat income tax rates, and $5,500-6,300 in Ghana which has a higher and more progressive rate. 
Note that these fiscal costs are the same magnitude or less than the amount remitted by high -
skilled emigrants – the difference being that remittances don‘t go to governments. 
We know much less about the third possible area of return – that is, how brain drain 
affects the production and health externalities that may arise through education. Currently, there 
are  no  studies  with  credible  estimates  that,  say,  the  benefit  of  1,000  fewer  skilled  workers 
migrating is an increase of X in productivity of other workers, or that the benefit to having 100 
doctors not emigrate is a saving of Y lives. We do know that the economic literature in general 
has struggled to find strong evidence of externalities from education.
7 In Gibson and McKenzie 
(2010) we review the range of estimates in the literature and show that even taking the high 
range of externality estimates would still only give a production externality of 80 percent of the 
home country average unskilled wage, or around $800 per year  per high-skilled migrant in the 
developing countries we study.  Yet it is also worth noting that governments in some developed 
countries seem to think these externalities are important, as evidenced by their attempts to make 
their immigration policies more skill-selective. On the other hand, the United Kingdom recently 
acted to reduce the number of skilled migrants from outside the E.U.  so it is likely that policy 
changes in this area run well ahead of the evidence base. 
The existing empirical evidence on health externalities from health worker migration is 
inconclusive. Clemens (2007) finds no evidence of a relationship between the rate of health 
professional  emigration  and  health  outcomes  in  Africa .  On  the  other  side,  Bhargava  and 
                                                           
6 This calculation uses a 2005 Gross National Income of 32.252 trillion Rs from the World Development Indicators, 
an exchange rate of 44 Rs to the dollar, and Desai et al. (2009)‘s estimate of 836,000 Indians aged 25+ in the U.S. 
7 We consider three forms of externalities: dynamic externalities, whereby schooling causes growth through an 
aggregate externality which shows up in the A term in a production function; static market externalities, where the 
income  and  productivity  of  a  worker  depends  on  the  education  levels  of  those  around  them  (such  as  through 
production complementarities); and static non-market externalities, whereby education also has positive benefits on 
political stability, civic participation, and other such outcomes.  19 
 
Docquier (2008) find an association between emigration and adult deaths from AIDS in African 
countries with high HIV incidence. When a larger sample covering developing countries from all 
regions is used, Bhargava et al. (2011) find no significant effect of medical brain drain on either 
infant and child mortality rates or child vaccination rates. These studies rely on cross-country 
panel analysis, with the associated limitations in being able to establish causal relationships. 
Measurement  of  these  health  externalities  of  skilled  migration  at  a  more  micro-level  is  an 
important area for future research. 
 
Conclusions 
Economists have been theorizing about brain drain for almost half a century. But until 
recently, there has been little empirical evidence to support or contradict these theories. The new 
evidence should counteract some of the myths and assuage some of the most common concerns 
about brain drain. Brain drain rates are not skyrocketing. Africa is not the most affected region 
for brain drain; small island states are. Most skilled migrants are not doctors. But neither are they 
taxi drivers – they enjoy massive increases in living standards as a result of migrating. The rise in 
skilled  migration  does  not  appear  to  be  crowding  out  migration  opportunities  for  unskilled 
migrants: instead, skilled and unskilled migration have increased together. Skilled migrants are 
remitting back about as much as the fiscal cost of their absence. Existing preliminary estimates 
of the production externalities of brain drain are quite small. 
Yet we are still some way from a comprehensive global answer on the effect of brain 
drain on sending country growth and development outcomes, and further still from knowing the 
efficacy of policies chosen with high-skilled migration in mind. Data limitations continue to be a 
huge challenge to work in this area: there is a pressing need for better data which tracks the flows 
of high-skilled workers back and forward, as well as for specialized surveys to better understand 
the  consequences  of  these  movements  (for  discussion  of  these  issues,  see  Commission  on 
International Migration Data for Development Research and Policy, 2009). We have discussed 
eight key questions about brain drain. Here we pose and leave for further research five more 




First, what is the value of the option to migrate for those who remain in their home countries? 
This calculation should include both an economic option value, as well as the utility individuals 
place on freedom of movement (Clemens, 2009). 
Second, what is the externality to a country of an additional doctor, taking into account that it 
is unlikely that the marginal doctor would be efficiently allocated to the most needy patients if 
that  doctor  did  not  migrate?  Likewise,  what  is  the  externality  that  a  scientist,  engineer,  or 
entrepreneur confers on their host society? 
Third, what is the effect of high-skilled migration on institutional development at home? 
Spilimbergo (2009) has shown that migration to study abroad in democratic countries increases 
democracy  in  the  sending  countries,  and  there  are  plenty  of  anecdotes  and  case  studies  of 
important leaders of independence movements who trained abroad. Yet we are certainly far from 
being able to show such effects apply more broadly, and even farther from putting a dollar or 
utility value on such effects. 
Fourth, how much does migration policy actually matter for determining the level of skilled 
migration? Jasso and Rozenzweig (2009) argue that much of the difference in the education 
composition of immigrants in Australia and those in the United States stems not from the more 
skill-selective policy of Australia, but from differences in geographic neighbors and in returns to 
skill in the two countries. Much more needs to be known about how much difference individual 
country policy actually makes in shaping the skill composition of its immigrants. 
Finally, if brain drain hinders development, then acting to limit brain drain should encourage 
development. But what are the actual development impacts of policy actions to reduce high-
skilled immigration, such as moratoriums on hiring doctors from poor countries, and the United 
Kingdom‘s proposed large reductions in the numbers of foreign students and skilled nationals 
from outside the European Union that would be allowed into the United Kingdom? If brain drain 
hinders development, such actions should benefit development in countries which send more 
migrants to the United Kingdom. However, we are doubtful that empirical studies of policies to 
limit migration of skilled workers—whether from sending or receiving countries—will show a 
net benefit.  
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Table 1: Top 10 Occupations for Educated Migrants from Developing Countries in the U.S.
Bachelors Degree and Above % Masters Degree and Above % PhD %
Computer Software Engineers 4.9 Physicians and Surgeons 9.2 Postsecondary Teachers 22.6
Registered Nurses 4.8 Postsecondary Teachers 7.4 Physical Scientists, All Other 9.1
Physicians and Surgeons 4.1 Computer Software Engineers 6.7 Medical Scientists 7.6
Accountants and Auditors 3.8 Managers, All Other 3.5 Physicians and Surgeons 7.6
Postsecondary Teachers 3.6 Accountants and Auditors 3.4 Computer Software Engineers 4.3
Managers, All Other 2.7 Elementary and Middle School Teachers 2.6 Managers, All Other 3.8
Elementary and Middle School Teachers 2.4 Medical Scientists 2.4 Engineers, All Other 3.2
Computer Scientists and Systems Analysts 2.0 Computer Scientists and Systems Analysts 2.3 Chemists and Materials Scientists 1.5
First-Line Supervisors/Managers of Retail Sales Workers 1.8 Physical Scientists, All Other 2.2 Computer Scientists and Systems Analysts 1.3
Computer Programmers 1.7 Computer Programmers 2.1 Computer Programmers 1.1
Sample Size  25169 10842 1936
Broader Occupational Categories
All medical professionals 12.7 15.2 11.8
All computer specialists 10.0 12.5 7.4
All engineers 4.1 5.7 7.5
All teachers and academics 3.6 7.4 22.6
Scientists and Social Scientists 3.8 7.2 22.7
Taxi drivers 0.5 1.1 0.1
Source: American Community Survey 2008 (Steven Ruggles et al, 2010).
Note: % refers to the percentage of all employed immigrants in this educational category








Occupation Share who Share who are Share who Share who are
are foreign-born born in developing  are foreign-born born in developing 
countries countries
Computer Software Engineers 0.36 0.27 0.62 0.47
Registered Nurses 0.14 0.10 0.22 0.17
Physicians and Surgeons 0.27 0.20 0.32 0.22
Accountants and Auditors 0.17 0.11 0.51 0.35
Postsecondary Teachers 0.21 0.12 0.27 0.14
Managers, All Other 0.12 0.07 0.35 0.17
Elementary and Middle School teachers 0.06 0.04 0.16 0.09
Computer Scientists and Systems Analysts 0.20 0.14 0.41 0.30
First-Line Supervisors/Managers of Retail Sales Workers 0.13 0.09 0.31 0.21
Computer Programmers 0.23 0.16 0.52 0.43
Medical Scientists 0.40 0.27 0.55 0.36
Physical Scientists, All Other 0.38 0.24 0.50 0.30
Engineers, All Other 0.23 0.16 0.57 0.36
Chemists and Materials Scientists 0.25 0.18 0.39 0.27
All Medical Professionals 0.14 0.10 0.24 0.16
All Computer Specialists 0.23 0.16 0.53 0.39
All Engineers 0.18 0.12 0.55 0.35
All Teachers and Academics 0.10 0.06 0.26 0.14
Scientists and Social Scientists 0.21 0.13 0.37 0.22
Source: American community Survey 2008 (Steven Ruggles et al, 2010).
Table is restricted to employed individuals aged 25-65
Table 2: Proportion of Immigrants among all U.S. workers in main occupations for educated migrants
Individuals with PhDs All Tertiary Educated
Table 3: Direct Evidence on the Brain Gain Channel
New Papua 
Ghana Micronesia Zealand New Guinea Tonga
Proportion who took schooling actions due to 
prospect of migrating abroad 0.32 0.16 0.08 0.16 0.20
Teachers teach different things as a result
of expectation some students will go abroad 0.08 0.35 n.a. 0.27 0.06
Source: Gibson and McKenzie (2010) surveys of top students, and surveys of teachers in their schools.
n.a. denotes not available, as teacher survey not undertaken in this country.